14 research outputs found
PowerSpy: Location Tracking using Mobile Device Power Analysis
Modern mobile platforms like Android enable applications to read aggregate
power usage on the phone. This information is considered harmless and reading
it requires no user permission or notification. We show that by simply reading
the phone's aggregate power consumption over a period of a few minutes an
application can learn information about the user's location. Aggregate phone
power consumption data is extremely noisy due to the multitude of components
and applications that simultaneously consume power. Nevertheless, by using
machine learning algorithms we are able to successfully infer the phone's
location. We discuss several ways in which this privacy leak can be remedied.Comment: Usenix Security 201
Decentralized Policy-Hiding Attribute-Based Encryption with Receiver Privacy
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables limiting access to encrypted data to users with certain attributes. Different aspects of ABE were studied, such as the multi-authority setting (MA-ABE), and policy hiding, meaning the access policy is unknown to unauthorized parties. However, no practical scheme so far provably provides both properties, which are often desirable in real-world applications: supporting decentralization, while hiding the access policy. We present the first practical decentralized ABE scheme with a proof of being policy-hiding. Our construction is based on a decentralized inner-product predicate encryption scheme, introduced in this paper, which hides the encryption policy. It results in an ABE scheme supporting conjunctions, disjunctions and threshold policies, that protects the access policy from parties that are not authorized to decrypt the content. Further, we address the issue of receiver privacy. By using our scheme in combination with vector commitments, we hide the overall set of attributes possessed by the receiver from individual authorities, only revealing the attribute that the authority is controlling. Finally, we propose randomizing-polynomial encodings that immunize the scheme in the presence of corrupt authorities
Countermeasures: Learning to Lie to Objects
Ubiquitous computing is leading to ubiquitous sensing. Sensor components such as motion, proximity, and biometric sensors are increasingly common features in everyday objects. However, the presence and full capabilities of these components are often not clear to users. Sensor-enhanced objects have the ability to perceive without being perceived. This reduces the ability of users to control how and when they are being sensed. To address this imbalance, this project identifies the need to be able to deceive 'smart' objects, and proposes a number of practical interventions to increase user awareness of sensors, and encourage agency over digital sensing through acts of dishonesty to objects
DolphinAtack: Inaudible Voice Commands
Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an
increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various
systems into voice controllable systems(VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows
that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control
the systems. Hidden voice commands, though hidden, are nonetheless audible. In
this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that
modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f > 20 kHz) to achieve
inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the
modulated low frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated,
recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems.
We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including
Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By
injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few
proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime
call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode,
and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose
hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to
detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine
(SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to
inaudible voice command attacks.Comment: 15 pages, 17 figure
There Goes Your PIN Exploiting Smartphone Sensor Fusion Under Single and Cross User Setting
A range of zero-permission sensors are found in modern smartphones to enhance user experience. These sensors can lead to unintentional leakage of user private data. In this paper, we combine leakage from a pool of zero-permission sensors, to reconstruct user's secret PIN used for unlocking the phone or personal finances. By harvesting the power of machine learning algorithms, we show a practical attack on the full four-digit PIN space. Able to classify all 10,000 PIN combinations, results show up to 83.7% success within 20 tries in a single user setting. Latest previous work demonstrated 74% success on a reduced space of 50 chosen PINs, where we report 99.5% success with a single try in a similar setting. Moreover, we extend the PIN recovery attack from a single user to a cross-user scenario. Firstly, we show that by training on several users, the PIN recovery success can be boosted, when a target user is part of the training pool. On the other hand, PIN recovery is still possible when training pool is mutually exclusive to the target user, albeit with low success rate